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The nationalization of the Suez Canal dealt a severe blow to Western countries—particularly the United Kingdom, France, and the United States—because control of the canal was critically important geopolitically and economically for each. For Britain, the Suez Canal was a main lever to maintain its global hegemony. The British government held a 44% stake in the Suez Canal Company, granting it significant political and economic influence in the region. Additionally, about 25% of Britain's imports passed through the Canal, further underscoring its strategic importance (1).
Control of the canal was equally significant for France. French ownership of the company was spread across approximately 70,000 French shareholders, representing substantial economic and financial stakes. Moreover, the French government was displeased with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s support for Algeria’s Arab national liberation movement, which directly threatened France by complicating its control over Algeria.
The United States primarily sought to prevent any limitation to NATO countries’ geopolitical sway in both regional and global arenas. It viewed the rise of a revolutionary government in Egypt aligned with the Soviet Union and anti-capitalist on one hand, but also espousing anti-Zionist and pan-Arab ideas aimed at forming a unified and powerful Arab state under Egyptian leadership, as a significant strategic threat—both to Israel’s security and to broader Western imperial interests in the Middle East.
Adding to the tension was Egypt’s growing closeness to the Soviet Union and its active involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement. This trend raised suspicions that Egypt might become a leading state not only in the Arab world but across the entire Third World. Actions by Britain, France, and the USA during the crisis were largely driven by their bourgeoisie’s global political and economic interests.
Regarding Israel’s interests in this conflict, in a response letter dated November 5, 1956, from Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin, Israel defended its attack on Egypt with two main arguments: the need to end Egypt’s blockade of the Straits of Tiran, which restricted Israel’s access to the Red Sea, and to curb attacks from Palestinian fighters in Gaza supported by Egypt (2). However, beyond these stated reasons, Israel also had other motives: like in other regional wars, it sought territorial expansion. At the same time, Israel aimed to exploit the moment of crisis to pressure Egypt’s revolutionary government, which had adopted openly anti-Zionist rhetoric. Israel also sought to regain support from Western European powers—this time through direct military intervention. Military support from France and Britain significantly boosted Israel’s confidence.
On October 30, the Soviet Union demanded UN Security Council action to stop Israel’s aggression. A ceasefire resolution backed by the USSR and the USA was vetoed by France and Britain. The next day, the two countries launched military operations in Egypt. On November 3, a ceasefire resolution was brought before the UN General Assembly and passed with 59 votes in favor and 5 against (1). On November 5, the Soviet Foreign Minister raised the issue of non-compliance by France and Britain in the Security Council, threatening that if hostilities did not stop within 12 hours, the USSR and the USA would use military force. The Soviets emphasized their readiness to sacrifice and defeat the aggressors. That same day, the USSR wrote to US President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposing joint efforts to end the conflict. When the US refused, the Soviet Union decided to take on the responsibility itself. Premier Bulganin sent letters to British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, French Premier Guy Mollet, and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, issuing warnings that in some cases even threatened missile strikes. These letters were quickly followed by responses affirming willingness to cease fire.
The publicly stated reasons for Western opposition to the nationalization of the Suez Canal were, in fact, propaganda to mask colonialist objectives. Western powers believed that Egyptian management of the canal was doomed to failure. Yet, as statistics indicate, this assumption proved false. Whereas in 1955 the Suez Canal handled about 13.5% of global maritime shipping, by 1966 it had increased to 16%. Cargo throughput doubled from 107 million tons to 247 million tons during that period (3). The canal’s disruption was not due to Egyptian incompetence but rather Israel’s subsequent aggressive war—a trusted Western ally—approximately a decade after the crisis. The closure of the canal during the 1967 Six-Day War harmed not only Egypt but also many economies worldwide. According to the UN, in the first four years alone the global economic loss caused by the canal’s shutdown exceeded $7 billion, increasing at around $1.7 billion annually (3). After eight years of inactivity, the canal was reopened on June 5, 1975. Soviet military specialists played a major role in clearing 40,000 mines and detonating over 750,000 explosives from the canal bed (3).
During the preparations for the attack, the US attempted diplomatic pressure to force Egypt to abandon nationalization and adopt the so-called “Dulles Plan,” which promoted foreign control of the canal and denied Egypt’s sovereign rights. Moreover, the US joined the UK in imposing a financial blockade on Egypt, halting funding for the Aswan Dam. However, once the war began, Washington publicly condemned the aggression by the three countries. The US’s duplicitous stance seems motivated both by a desire to placate the Arab world and to prevent post-war alignment of newly independent states with the Soviet bloc. At the same time, the US did not want to provoke resentment in Arab societies by overtly supporting aggression. Thus its most advantageous position was a double game, creating distance from direct military intervention. Had the US applied a harsher policy toward Egypt, the crisis might have escalated into a broader war and brought the US and USSR into direct confrontation, as happened during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
It appears the US expected the aggression to collapse under Soviet resistance and its own diplomatic stance—damaging British and French influence in the region and making it easier for the US to assume their colonial roles. Indeed, the Suez Crisis marked another failure of British and French Middle Eastern policy. The British lost their remaining economic influence in Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan removed British officer Glubb Pasha from command of the Arab Legion, and the 1958 Iraqi revolution ended the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy and ushered in a pro-Soviet republic. France, similarly, was forced to abandon Algeria in 1962 to the victorious Arab national liberation movement. The US indeed stepped in to replace Western European colonial powers, which was confirmed by the January 5, 1957 publication of the Eisenhower Doctrine proclaiming the US right to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs under the banner of anti-communism.
Soviet diplomatic tactics—responding to aggression with threats—effectively halted the joint war against Egypt, boosting Soviet prestige across the Arab and Third World. The USSR replaced the US and Britain in funding and constructing major industrial projects in Egypt, including the Aswan Dam and the Helwan steel complex. This was a major success for Marxist-Leninist ideology: a revolutionary, anti-imperialist government committed to non-capitalist development in Egypt retained power without losing territory, despite facing far more powerful adversaries—Britain, France, and Israel.
The Suez Crisis provided fertile ground for the spread of Nasser’s ideas across the entire Arab world, emphasizing pan-Arab national consciousness and the arbitrarily drawn colonial borders. Two years later, in February 1958, Egypt and Syria united to form the United Arab Republic under President Gamal Abdel Nasser. In March 1958, an anti-monarchical revolution occurred in Iraq, led by the “Free Officers,” modeled on Egypt’s 1952 revolution. The so-called “Nasserite wave” threatened Lebanon, Jordan, and other Arab countries, prompting Western-backed monarchies to take measures against revolutionary ideas. The resulting confrontation between revolutionary and monarchist Arab states is often referred to as the “Arab Cold War.”